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Labour markets in newly integrating economies 




We start with an elementary economic proposition distinguishing labour markets from 
commodity markets with implications for economic growth. Labour markets differ 
fundamentally from commodity markets because the price of labour cannot be pushed to 
zero in the situations of oversupply typical in the developing countries. Their functioning is 
therefore subject to some socially determined (positive) minimum supply price of labour and 
is characterised by perpetual disequilibrium as reflected in the rate of unemployment. In the 
advanced industrialised countries with very high elasticity of capital, labour supply is a 
primary constraint on economic growth and unemployment is of a frictional or cyclical nature. 
The reproducible tangible capital-constrained developing countries are characterised by 
unlimited labour supplies at some positive socially determined minimum supply price. Lewis 
(1954) proposed a two-sector model of economic growth for such countries. This model 
postulated a gradual transfer of labour from a subsistence (S) sector (using traditional low-
productivity technology and acting as a residual absorber of unlimited labour supplies) to a 
capitalist (C) sector using modern, higher-productivity technology with high output supply 
elasticity and operating on a profit-maximising commercial basis. The critical difference here 
in comparison with the two-sector neoclassical model of growth was that the socially 
determined minimum supply price of labour was given by the average product in the S sector 
and not the marginal product of labour, which is zero in the S sector. Labour being in 
abundant supply, the primary constraint on growth in a closed economy was argued to be 
wage goods (primarily food grains) supply produced in the S sector with low elasticity of 
supply. 
As regards the analytical framework, we adopt the evolutionary institutional framework 
suggested by North (1990). In this framework, the economic performance of nations, which 
interacts with and shapes labour market outcomes, is taken to be determined by 
demography, technology and institutions. Slow-changing and path-dependent demographic 
forces control long-term labour supply – its characterisation changes from being infinitely 
elastic in developing countries to being the ultimate primary constraint on economic growth in 
the advanced industrialised countries. Technology determines the process of transformation 
of primary and produced inputs into outputs of goods and services which contribute to the 
welfare of the population. The pace of technological change has accelerated in the last three 
decades or so. Mutually reinforcing interaction between demographic and technological 
changes is governed by institutions. North proposes the notion of an institutional matrix (IM) 
comprising formal and informal rules of the game along with their enforcement characteristics 
in social, political and economic domains. Formal rules comprise all formally binding 
procedures while informal rules include society-specific ideological beliefs, traditions, 
customs, conventions and widely accepted codes of conduct and other behavioural norms. 
For a given society, IM may be regarded as a society-specific customised institutional 
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software governing interaction in social, political and economic domains involving 
competition and cooperation among the participants. Self-interest-based society-specific 
motivating forces for action are provided by the incentive structure embedded in a given IM 
that indicates opportunities for gains in the social, political and economic sphere. North 
maintains that institutions, in combination with demography and technology, constitute the 
key determinants of the economic performance of nations. In the specific context of the 
labour market, labour participation practices, minimum acceptable supply price of labour in a 
situation of unlimited labour supplies and adjustment lags in responding to incentives and 
disincentives, the factors that influence labour market flexibility, are all socio-politically 
determined such that the labour market becomes a social institution.  
1.  A brief perspective on global integration in China and India 
The pace of globalisation has been governed by technological changes in transport and 
communications, national trade policies and international institutions such as GATT and its 
successor the WTO, which, by laying down and enforcing rules for international exchange, 
have reduced the uncertainties involved in exchanges separated in time and space.  
By a deliberate choice of trade policy, both India and China chose to insulate themselves 
from the global economy immediately after independence in 1947 (India) and 1949 (China). 
China, after remaining closed since the revolution in 1949, started integrating its economy 
with the global economy aggressively in 1978, beginning with merchandise trade in the 
1980s and following it up with private foreign investment. Similarly, after remaining one of the 
most heavily regulated and closed market economies in the world for more than three 
decades after independence, India started hesitant liberalisation of domestic investment in 
the 1980s and followed with systemic liberalisation (including foreign trade and investment) 
from 1991 onwards. The US dollar value of total exports of goods and services from China 
grew at an annual rate of 18.1% between 1995 and 2004, whereas that of India grew at 
12.6% over the same period. There was acceleration in total exports between 2000 and 
2004, at 23.8% per annum for China and 16.6% for India (Bosworth and Collins (2007), 
Table 5).  
Progressive integration of these two most populous economies should be obvious. Being the 
late starter, India has been growing at a slower rate than China. These two economies are 
included among the E7 emerging market economies (EMEs) along with Brazil, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Russia and Turkey. It is important to note that the recent growth spurts in these 
economies have been associated with their increasing integration with the world economy. 
They appear to have clearly benefited in terms of economic growth from their participation in 
the international division of labour.  
The degree of integration among the two Asian giants differs, however. In the just released 
Trade and Development Index (TDI) for 2006 prepared by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), India ranks at the lower end of the third quartile, at 86 
among 123 countries. The remaining six EMEs are in the upper half, with Korea at 21, China 
at 25 and Russia, at 58, being the lowest-ranked among the six. While India led the seven 
EMEs in terms of international finance, macroeconomic stability and trade performance, it 
lagged behind other EMEs in respect of human capital, physical infrastructure and openness 
to trade (Economic Times (2007a)). In other words, despite strong trade performance in 
terms of growth rates of trade variables and significant trade liberalisation in comparison with 
the pre-1991 period, especially non-trade barriers to trade in India remain high in comparison 
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2. Demographic  trends 
This section can be brief as other papers in the conference will be dealing with demographic 
trends in detail. Ageing of the population and labour force in the developed countries are well 
known facts. Population growth rates have slowed and life expectancy has been extended in 
most developing countries as well. In the present context of labour markets, we may only 
briefly note the contrast between the two most populous countries, which account for 40% of 
the world population.  
Focusing on the prime or working age group (between 15 and 59 years of age), over the 20-
year period between 2005 and 2025, the prime age population in China is projected to rise 
from 885,182 million to 896,091 million or 0.62% per annum, and its share in the total 
population to decline from 67.4% to 62.0%.
2 In contrast, the working age population in India 
is projected to rise from 671,609 million to 899,652 million between 2006 and 2026 (about 
the same magnitude as that in China in that period) or 1.47% per annum while its share in 
the total population is expected to rise from 60.4% to 64.3%.
3 As part of the demographic 
transition, in this scenario India would thus be getting the so-called demographic dividend of 
a rising share of working age population and hence a rising potential labour supply despite a 
slowdown in the rate of growth of the total population. With a large pool of working age 
population, India and China would then face the challenge of putting them to productive uses 
by maintaining strong economic performance, which would be partly reinforced by the savers 
exceeding the dissavers (those with negative savings) in a younger population. It is 
estimated that more than half the world’s working age population will be located in these two 
countries in the next five years.  
3.  Recent trends in economic growth in India and China 
As mentioned earlier, since labour markets interact with and are shaped by economic 
performance, we note recent trends in economic growth in India and China. In this regard, 
we draw on Bosworth and Collins (2007), who undertake a comparison of the economic 
performance of these two Asian giants over the period 1978–2004. This period captures the 
growth spurts in the two economies in comparison with their pre-1978 past. The authors 
divide the period into two subperiods: 1978–93 (Period I) and 1993–2004 (Period II). As 
noted in Section 2, the second period covers the post-1991 systemic reforms in India, which 
included significant external trade liberalisation. The Chinese economic reforms process, 
seeking to establish a “socialist market economy”, spanned the entire period. The first 
subperiod involved the replacement of agricultural collectives by a household responsibility 
system that restored economic incentive in production. The second saw the reform of state-
owned enterprises. 
Aggregate GDP experienced acceleration from Period I to Period II in both countries 
although the annual growth rate in China was much higher, at 8.9% (Period I) and 9.7% 
(Period II), compared to 4.5% and 6.5% respectively in India. With a slowdown in workforce 
growth in both countries, per worker productivity also accelerated from 6.5% to 8.5% 
annually in China and from 2.4% to 4.6% annually in India. Around half of this was 
contributed by total factor productivity growth (TFPG), which reflects outward shifts in 
production function through technological changes. TFPG in China was three times higher 
than in India in Period I and about twice as high in Period II. At sectoral level, TFP in the 
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secondary sector (whose major component is industry) experienced acceleration in China 
from 3.1% annually to 6.2% and the level of TFPG was as high as 10 times (Period I, 1978–93) 
and five times (Period II, 1993–2004) that in India. TFP accelerated in the services sector in 
India, from 1.4% annually to 3.9%, while it decelerated in China. It should be obvious that 
increasing integration of these two countries has been associated with acceleration in both 
GDP and TFP, thus bringing out a powerful instrumental role played by international trade in 
economic growth. However, the composition of export earnings between goods and services 
presents an interesting contrast. The share of exports of goods in total current export 
earnings increased in China from 87.0% in 1995 to 90.4% in 2004. In India’s case the share 
of services increased from 17.8% to 32.9% over the same period. In other words, China has 
become the manufacturing powerhouse of the world while a similar role is being assumed by 
India in respect of services.  
4. Labour  market  outcomes of economic growth 
In a stylised version, the labour market outcome of economic growth is the result of 
interaction between supply of and demand for labour in productive activities. Supply of labour 
is determined by demographic factors, labour force participation behaviour and socio-
culturally determined minimum supply price expectation. Demand for labour is derived from 
economic growth triggered by expanding domestic and external demands and technological 
changes, both of which generate incentives for domestic producers to employ labour in 
productive activities. To begin with, we first present stylised outcomes at the economy-wide 
level before introducing broad details regarding labour markets. We note up front that our 
discussion of China is handicapped by our lack of acquaintance with the finer details of 
Chinese official statistics. The discussion focuses on employment, the concepts of which 
appear to be broadly similar in the two countries.  
Starting with work participation behaviour as reflected in worker population ratio (WPR), for 
the entire Indian population (all ages), the estimated number of workers in 2004–05 (from the 
National Sample Survey (NSS)) was 458 million with a WPR of 41.88%. From the Key 
Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries published by the Asian Development 
Bank, we find that the Chinese workforce stood at 752 million in 2004, with a WPR of 
59.10%. The Chinese workforce was thus 60% larger, and its WPR 17 percentage points 
higher, than that in India. The WPR reflects behaviour shaped by sociocultural and economic 
factors and is known to differ across gender and location (rural-urban). The NSS-based 
reported WPR for India in 2004 was 54.6% for rural males, 54.9% for urban males, 32.7% for 
rural females and as low as 16.6% for urban females. We could not trace corresponding 
details for China. Li and Zax (no date) quote a sample survey-based estimate of WPR for 
1995 of 79.7% for males and 68.7% for females. They expect this to decline over time. The 
corresponding rural-urban population-weighted WPR for India was 54.7% for males and 
28.2% for females. China thus has a much larger workforce with a significantly higher 
average WPR than India for both male and female workers, but very significantly higher for 
females (by 40.5 percentage points) than for males (by 25 percentage points). 
We turn next to the inter-sectoral shifts in workforce that are also described as structural 
changes. It may be noted that changes in the composition of domestic demand with rises in 
per capita income bring about shifts in workforce from agricultural sectors with lower than 
average productivity per worker to non-agricultural sectors with higher than average 
productivity per worker during the growth process in a closed economy. These inter-sectoral 
shifts accelerate with integration with the global economy and technological changes which 
make for a faster pace of structural changes. In general, the higher the rate of economic 
growth, the faster in pace and greater in quantitative magnitude are the inter-sectoral shifts in 
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As a result of the average annual GDP growth of 9.3% in China during 1978–2004, the share 
of the primary (mostly agricultural) sector in the workforce declined by 24 percentage points 
from 71% to 47%. The industrial sector gained only 6 percentage points from this shift, while 
the tertiary sector picked up the remaining 18 percentage points. With nearly half the 
aggregate GDP growth rate of China, the Indian average annual growth rate of 5.4% during 
1978–2004 brought about a 14 percentage point decline in the primary sector share from 
71% to 57%. Of this decline, 5 percentage points were taken by the industrial sector and 9 by 
the tertiary sector, to reach shares of 18% and 25% respectively in 2004. 
5. Social  consequences  of structural changes 
Kuznets (1972) had pointed out 25 years ago that underneath the innocuous looking macro-
level percentage point shifts in workforce are micro-level pains of adjustment – rural-urban, 
inter-industrial, inter-occupational and inter-factory movements of workers – involving 
uprooting from a familiar social and production environment and adjustment to new 
socioeconomic surroundings in new jobs. Pains of adjustment also involve unemployment for 
varying intervals, obsolescence of technologies forcing reskilling or the prospect of 
permanent unemployability, and widening earning differentials that result from technology 
upgrades and emergence of demand-supply imbalances (a) between existing and newly 
required skills, (b) between locations of faster-growing sunrise and lagging sunset industries 
and (c) between locations of slower- and faster-growing units. It is important to note that 
labour market turbulence involving pains of adjustment resulting from structural shifts in 
workforce during economic growth is inherent in every growing dynamic economy, with or 
without globalisation, and cannot be escaped even in a closed economy. It is a necessary 
price of having economic growth that enables sustained improvements in living standards of 
the population that includes workers undergoing pains of adjustment. Globalisation merely 
adds to the turbulence in the labour markets while providing a potential boost to economic 
growth. Globalisation is not the only factor causing turbulence in labour markets, however. 
There are also internal factors contributing to this turbulence. These include, apart from 
technological changes, changes in the structure of domestic demand in response to a rise in 
per capita income and domestic infrastructural deficiencies in the transport and 
communications network that impede mobility in large continental countries like China and 
India. In the Indian context, religious, linguistic, cultural and caste-based diversities also 
contribute to social networking difficulties and hence act as barriers to labour mobility. 
The pains of structural adjustment generate social tensions and human problems to which 
every government – democratic or authoritarian – has to be sensitive in order to maintain 
legitimacy to rule. Alleviation of these pains through social safety nets and other social 
institutional arrangements for socially acceptable sharing of pains of adjustment become 
important in this context. 
6.  Emerging labour market problems 
In this section, we focus mostly on India for reasons of greater familiarity, although the nature 
of the problems discussed would be similar in China also. 
Over the last five years, the Indian economy appears to have entered a higher growth path. 
GDP at (constant 1999–2000) factor cost has accelerated from an average annual rate of 
6.3% from 1992–93 to 1999–2000 to 7.0% during the seven-year period from 2000–01 to 
2006–07. This acceleration has been greater in the last five years (since 2003–04) with 
average GDP growth of 8.7% (quick estimate for 2006–07 and advance estimate for   
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external demand and liberalised domestic entrepreneurship. The acceleration in GDP has 
been supported by a sustained increase in gross domestic investment rates (at current 
prices) from 24.3% of GDP in 2000–01 to 35.3% in 2006–07 and in the gross domestic 
saving rate, which rose from 23.7% to 34.8% (quick estimate) over the same period. 
While domestic demand continues to be dominant, a major change in the composition of 
external demand warrants discussion as it also reflects cost competitiveness. Exports of both 
goods and services have registered double digit growth over the last decade. Services export 
earnings as a ratio of current total (goods plus services) export earnings increased from an 
average of 18.0% during 1990–95 to 39.0% in 2006–07, the latest available fiscal year (April 
to March). Over the last decade, India’s service exports have grown at a rate exceeding 20% 
annually and their share in world exports of services rose from 0.6% in 1995 to 2.2% in 2005 
(RBI (2007), p 89) and further to 2.5% in 2006 (RBI (2008)). With its low cost of operations, 
high quality of service products, readily available technical manpower (so far), a favourable 
time zone difference and a general facility with the English language, newer and newer 
services are being sourced internationally from India. This is reflected in the fact that while 
the share of widely discussed software exports in total services export earnings has 
stagnated around 40%, that of non-software (new) miscellaneous services (which started 
being classified separately in 2004–05 in balance of payments statistics; see RBI (2008)) has 
rocketed from 21.3% to 38.2% in 2006–07 (RBI (2007), p 90). This indirectly corroborates the 
finding of Bosworth and Collins (2007) that TFPG contributed an overwhelming 72% to the 
5.4% average annual growth in per worker productivity of services in India during 
1993–2004. Export growth combined with the booming domestic economy has been 
generating increasing direct and indirect demand for high- and middle-level skills and is 
beginning to be reflected in labour shortages, especially in urban centres with high attrition 
and turnover rates. This is a manifestation mostly of demand-supply imbalances in terms of 
requirements and availability of educated and trained workers, but it is partly also 
accentuated by the barriers to mobility arising from inadequacies in transport and 
communication infrastructure and social networking difficulties arising from socio-cultural and 
linguistic diversities. This issue has several dimensions, which we discuss on the basis of the 
latest available NSS of employment and unemployment for 2004–05.  
7.  Rural-urban, gender and educational dimensions of the Indian 
workforce 
We may mention that the rural-urban composition of the relevant categories of workforce is 
relevant in the context of demand-supply imbalances because rural-urban migration in 
search of jobs, though rising, is still not significant. The gender dimension is relevant 
because of the very low WPRs – lower among urban women, who are better educated, than 
among rural women – reported earlier (Section 5). In the absence of appropriate 
quantification of skills, we use education as a surrogate for the same.  
The total Indian prime age (15 years and older) workforce was estimated to be 449 million in 
2004–05 (see Table 1 below). Of this figure, 284 million (63%) were either illiterate or had 
four years or less of schooling (lines 1 and 2 in Table 1). Another 109 million (24%), two 
thirds of whom were based in rural locations, had between four and nine years of education 
(lines 3 and 4 in Table 1). Thus 87% of the workforce possessed education and skills just 
enough for absorption either in low-productivity primary activities or low-skilled secondary 
activities. Just 22% of the workforce was employed in the secondary sector in 2004–05, with 
only one-and-a-half times the average productivity per worker. Bosworth and Collins (2007) 
noted that per worker productivity in the secondary sector grew at a meagre annual rate of 
3.1% during 1978–2004, of which only a little over one third was due to TFPG necessary for 
international competitiveness. In other words, technological dynamism was not as 
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The remaining 13% (56 million) of the total workforce had completed at least 10 years of 
schooling (lines 5 to 7 in Table 1), one third of whom were located in rural areas. This subset 
included 28 million workers having graduate level or higher education, of whom only 16% 
were females. In addition, about 7 million reported having some form of technical diploma or 
certificate, 50% of whom were located in rural areas. 
 
Table 1 
Estimated number of workers aged 15 years  
and older in India in 2004–05 by completed level of education  
In millions 










1. Not literate    72,721    80,091    11,741    8,799    173,352 
2. Literate up to primary    63,254    22,194    20,345    4,789    110,582 
3.  Middle  school   38,942   10,494    17,387    2,807   69,630 
4.  Secondary   20,009    4,342    13,444    1,722   39,517 
5. Higher secondary    9,897    1,689   8,245   1,203    21,034 
6. Diploma/certificate    2,152   603   3,316    802    6,873 
7. Graduate and above    8,176   1,086    15,146    3,468    27,876 
8.  Total     215,151   120,499    89,624    23,590   448,864 
Source: Calculated from the tables given in Sundaram (2007) based on the 61st Round of the National Sample 
Survey on Employment and Unemployment (July 2004 to June 2005). 
 
Turning to new sources of demand for labour during the post-integration period, these have 
been rising at a rapid pace more in services than in manufacturing. High-value services in 
international demand for sourcing from India are mostly located in urban centres and require 
professional training and often pre-qualifying entrance tests in view of wide diversity in the 
quality of formal education in India. These opportunities have generally been beyond the 
reach of the overwhelmingly unskilled and less educated workforce. 
Even the formal degree holders are afflicted by indifferent quality and often fail to clear the 
entrance tests for some high-value service sector jobs. India produces 441,000 technical 
graduates, nearly 2.5 million other graduates and more than 300,000 postgraduates every 
year. According to Mr Kiran Karnik, the former President of the National Association of 
Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), one fifth of India’s annual tertiary 
educational output is “world-class”, one fifth “passable” and three fifths “lamentable” 
(Economist (2006)). Thus, a large proportion of the reported formally educated segment of 
the Indian population, though qualified on paper and large in numerical magnitude, has been 
found to be unemployable or earning much less than commensurate with their formal 
qualifications due to the unsatisfactory quality of their training. Diversion of the remaining 
limited talent to the mostly urban, fast-growing services sector has been generating 
shortages of high-level skills in the manufacturing sector. In addition, the booming domestic 
demand arising from the fast pace of growth has been adding to the urban shortages of 
middle-level skills. Shaped by socioeconomic and cultural factors, very low work participation 
rates even among educated and qualified women, though changing, further accentuate the 
scarcity of skilled and educated labour. Increased turnover and high attrition rates have, 
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The Indian case thus represents a paradox. Islands of acute scarcity of skilled and educated 
labour are reported in the urban areas in fast-growing service industries while the large bulk 
of the workforce – both rural and urban – is absorbed in low-productivity activities. 
Comparable details for the Chinese workforce could not be easily traced. Reports indicate 
that the manufacturing sector has been experiencing labour shortages especially in the 
fastest-growing (eastern) coastal belt. From Bosworth and Collins (2007) we observe that 
despite phenomenal growth in exports of goods amounting to 18.6% annually between 1995 
and 2004 and 11.0% annual growth in secondary GDP between 1993 and 2004, the share of 
the workforce in the secondary sector increased only marginally (by 1 percentage point, from 
22% to 23%) between 1993 and 2004.
4 We also find from Brooks and Tao (2003) that 
employment in manufacturing declined from 98.0 million in 1997 to 80.8 million in 2001 and, 
more importantly, that in labour-intensive textiles, garments and leather and fur also declined 
from 11.1 million in 1997 to 8.4 million in 2001.
5 These facts seem to indicate that the 18.6% 
annual growth in exports of goods between 1995 and 2004 was driven more by raising per 
worker productivity and volume expansion of exports than by exploiting labour intensity.  
Another piece of evidence is quoted from two urban household surveys for 1988 and 1995 
(Li and Zax (no date)). It indicates that the proportion of the population having an education 
level equivalent to lower middle school and below declined between 1988 and 1995 from 
51.2% to 36.1% for men and from 60.2% to 47.6% for women. Interestingly, the proportion of 
technical and professional workers increased from 15.5% to 21.7% for men and from 15.6% 
to 23.4% for women over the same period. (As late as 2004–05, the corresponding 
proportion in India was much lower, at 7.8% for urban male workers and 14.3% for urban 
female workers.) The Chinese shares must have risen higher by 2004 because there has 
been a massive increase in educational and training programmes as reported in a recent 
white paper on China’s Employment Situation and Policies (see China Daily (2004) for 
details).  
Another report mentions labour shortages being mostly confined to “advanced skilled 
workers” in the Pearl River delta industrial zone.
6 It appears that the demand for professional 
and technical workers resulting from 18.6% annual growth in exports of goods must have 
outstripped the available supply. Interestingly, quoting a private researcher, the same report 
also mentions (local) shortages of manual workers in the last two years in Guangdong 
factories “partly as a result of new agricultural policies that had raised farm incomes (thereby 
raising minimum supply price expectation) and partly due to low wages in Guangdong 
factories” as well as poor working conditions and low job security. It thus appears that 
demand even for manual labour has been rising more rapidly than supply in the fast-growing 
eastern belt due to rising minimum supply expectations despite relaxation of regulations on 
rural-urban migration. 
8.  Responses to imbalances and scarcities in India 
The evidence presented in this section is anecdotal, based on newspaper reports rather than 
systematic research, as no nationwide scientific survey has been carried out so far. 
However, the available evidence is in line with what a priori reasoning would suggest. 
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Historically, government administration and public sector enterprises (PSEs) had been the 
major source of secure and lifetime jobs in India, encouraged by the state policy of 
indiscriminate expansion of government activities in the commercial sphere producing non-
public (or, in the terminology of public economics, “private”) goods and services (Tendulkar 
and Bhavani (2007)). Many PSEs operating in commercial areas that had earlier enjoyed 
monopoly positions were subjected to competition from the private units after their entry was 
permitted as part of the systemic liberalisation in 1991. As a consequence, PSE employment 
has been on the decline in recent years. Some labour restructuring at the enterprise level in 
the private sector had been taking place despite overprotective labour legislation but in the 
aggregate, employment gains have dominated over the employment losses in the 
manufacturing sector.  
A major response to the internationally traded services sector expansion in the recent period 
has been the emergence of half a dozen temporary staffing agencies supplying temporary 
white-collar workers to multinational corporations and other Indian companies. This new 
phenomenon is described as just-in-time, short-term flexi-hiring or simply temping (see 
Business World (2005)). It is a three-way institutionalised arrangement between employees 
looking for work, companies that do not want permanent staff on their rolls or have short-term 
projects and the intermediary staffing agency, which keeps temporary workers on its rolls 
and also maintains an employee database to supply multiple skills at short notice on a 
commission basis. 
While this is new in India, such staffing agencies have been in existence in the advanced 
industrialised countries since the Second World War. Some international staffing companies 
set up shop in India around 2000 and have expanded through the acquisition of local 
startups. Some new Indian startups have emerged in the face of high rates of attrition of 
professional workers in major cities like Chennai, Bangalore, Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai. 
The Business World report quoted above estimated that there were some 50,000 temporary 
workers on the payroll of the staffing agencies, including a top 2% earning more than 
INR 100 thousand (approx USD 2,500) per month; 3% in junior to mid-management positions 
(six to ten years’ experience) earning between INR 30 and 50 thousand (approx USD 750–
1,250) per month; 15% in engineering services, customer support and marketing with two to 
six years’ experience and drawing between INR 10 and 30 thousand (approx USD 250–750) 
per month; and an overwhelming 80% at the bottom end of the scale, with one to two years’ 
experience in sales, marketing, administration and other miscellaneous services and earning 
between INR 6 and 10 thousand (approx USD 150–250) per month. This was the case in the 
nascent stage two years back; the market for temporary workers must have expanded since 
then. The staffing agencies represent a more sophisticated and organised version of the 
labour contractor system in India that has been prevalent for supplying workers for 
agricultural operations in peak seasons in the agriculturally prosperous states and for other 
urban construction projects by bringing in temporary workers from other states. It is also 
worth mentioning that large armies of labourers hired from labour contractors in large-scale 
urban construction projects used to be a familiar sight. That is no longer seen and in its 
place, large-scale mechanised equipment handled by skilled workmen has become a 
common sight in all metropolitan construction projects. 
A recent report (Times of India (2007)) mentions the findings from the India Labour Report 
2007, a study commissioned by the staffing agency TeamLease Services based in Chennai 
in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. It noted that 90% of (presumably mostly urban, white-
collar) jobs are skill-based and talked about the “skill deficit”, poor-quality skills or education 
resulting in 58% of the country’s graduate degree holders earning less than the lowest of the 
bottom 80% in the Business World estimate discussed above. It traced the unemployability of 
youth to failure in receiving quality education and lack of vocational and technical training at 
the middle and high school levels. 
We now discuss two reports appearing side by side on the same page and by the same 
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The first report narrates the woes of educated rural youth turning to urban jobs in the face of 
the uneconomic and declining average size of agricultural holdings and the declining trend 
rate of agricultural growth in India. They are finding the going difficult because of limited 
holding capacity in the absence of social networking and an inability to speak English, a 
common handicap in rural schools. The report describes the pains of transition from farm to 
non-farm jobs, involving mental stress, new and often unanticipated challenges and great 
hope, expectations and aspirations. However, failure to adjust in unfamiliar urban 
surroundings and other unpleasant cultural shocks are making such transitions difficult and 
prolonged. 
The second report discusses a welcome experiment that provides a possible pointer towards 
a remedy to the problem posed in the first report. Two years ago, the government of the 
southern agricultural state of Andhra Pradesh started the Employment Generation and 
Marketing Mission (EGMM) to address the employability problem among underprivileged 
rural youth. It is a public-private partnership venture started by the state government with the 
help of the World Bank, the central government and seed capital of INR 50 million (approx 
USD 1.25 million). It is a training-cum-placement programme wherein the training areas and 
course modules are identified and put together by private companies in accordance with their 
commercial requirements. Different vocational modules are being developed for rural youth 
having different levels of education ranging from illiterate, to those having completed 10 to 
12 years of schooling, to those with graduate degrees and above. Teachers are being locally 
recruited and put through aggressive training programmes with the help of companies. 
Private companies are being encouraged to support the programme financially. In 2006, the 
EGMM trained 45,000 rural youth, 80% of whom went into a job on completion. Many large 
corporates, including multinationals, are collaborating in the programme – and not out of 
altruism; rather, they are finding that the programme is well tailored to their requirements and 
in the face of rising attrition rates among urban youth, it is giving them an opportunity to 
recruit better motivated and trained youth with much lower rates of attrition. 
Most large companies are going to the reputed educational institutions before final 
examinations take place and recruiting fresh graduates who are not necessarily trained in the 
required jobs and following up with orientation and in-house training programmes tailored to 
their specific requirements. Several large companies are also maintaining “bench strength” in 
anticipation of demand and apprehending labour shortages. Other companies are 
establishing their offices in tier one and two cities and spreading their recruitment net wider. 
Still others are recruiting middle-aged ladies with grown-up children for training in an effort to 
reduce attrition rates and offering them flexible working hours. Flexible hours are also being 
offered to male workers. 
We may also mention one more recent report appearing in the Economic Times of 
13  November 2007 (Economic Times (2007d)). It notes that the average salaries of IT 
workers are growing at 12% annually, while the Indian rupee, too, has appreciated 12% 
since April 2007. Despite these adverse factors, an Indian software engineer’s average 
salary is one fifth of what his/her counterpart in the United States and Europe earns. The 
report claims that this is still a profitable proposition even though the salary differential is up 
in one year from the one tenth mentioned in Economist (2006). This survey cites many more 
anecdotes of labour scarcity as well as exploring the means adopted to overcome it.  
Our discussion in this section is admittedly selective and subjective. The idea is to give a 
flavour of the emerging labour market problems arising out of scarcity of skilled labour in 
certain fast-growing service industries in metropolitan areas. While these are in the limelight 
of public discussions, we should not be oblivious to the fact that they apply only to a small 
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9.  Medium- to long-run issues in labour markets in India and China 
It should be obvious that, with 57% of the workforce in India and 47% in China in 2004 being 
engaged in the primary sector, where the average productivity per worker was estimated to 
be one fifth that in the non-agricultural sector, labour markets in both these countries would 
continue to be characterised by unlimited labour supplies and pains of transition from 
traditional agricultural to modern non-agricultural activities, as the currently advanced 
countries historically were during their industrialisation phase. The transition to the 
industrialisation of the workforce has been prolonged in both countries, partly by the past 
demographic pressures on land and partly by very slow growth of GDP (around 3.5% 
annually for three decades after their respective independence). The result has been the 
emergence of a large and persistent informal or unorganised segment of the workforce since 
the 1978 reforms in China and from an earlier period in India due to the preferential state 
policies towards small-scale and traditional industries.  
Both countries indiscriminately expanded the ambit of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a 
matter of state policy for three decades starting in the 1950s. In India this was done to 
discriminate against large private capitalist enterprises while in China, it was part of the 
transition to socialism. China has successfully carried out the transition from the pre-reform 
system of direct allocation of jobs and administrative control of wages to a gradual evolution 
of the labour market. In India, the labour market in the large-scale private organised factories 
and public sector enterprises continues to be regulated by overprotective legislation that 
introduced formal inflexibility in hiring of labour. It may be mentioned, however, that faster 
growth of private factory manufacturing output during the post-1991 reform period has taken 
place on the basis of informalisation of flexibility in the labour markets at the factory level 
under which trade unions at the national level keep opposing any dilution of the 
overprotective labour legislation while workers at the factory level have come to accept the 
fact of flexibility in hiring, including layoffs and retrenchment (Tendulkar and Bhavani (2007)). 
In the 1990s, China appears to have successfully implemented the downsizing of SOEs as 
well as public administration. As many as 8.9 million workers are reported to have been laid 
off in 1996, 5.74 million of which were from SOEs (Chinese Labour Statistics Yearbook 
(1997) quoted in Li and Zax (no date)). A three-stage social security system was introduced 
for the laid off workers with an in-built disincentive of a declining magnitude of compensation 
for workers remaining without an alternative job for long intervals. Under this system, until the 
laid off worker finds alternative employment, he/she continues to be linked with the SOE for 
three years on the basic salary, unemployment compensation (lower than basic salary) for 
the next two years and (still lower) minimum income assistance thereafter. In India, there has 
been no downsizing of public administration and very gradual downsizing of public sector 
enterprises forced by having to face competition from domestic and international private 
sector units in the same operations. 
One adjustment that China has to undertake but not India relates to the accession to the 
World Trade Organization that has been partly driving labour market reforms. It was 
estimated that this could involve job losses – some 13 million in rural areas, especially those 
on marginal lands without much chance of moving to higher value-added crops and 
1.5 million in urban areas, mainly in automotive and machinery industries (Li and Zhai (1999) 
quoted in Brooks and Tao (2003)). The same paper also mentioned the IMF staff estimate of 
some slowdown in GDP growth in the short run due to restructuring, but higher growth in the 
medium run. 
The final interesting question relates to the possibility of mutual competition in the world 
markets between the two Asian giants with unlimited labour supplies. So far China has 
scored over India in manufacturing while India has established a competitive advantage over 
China in internationally traded technical and professional services. Both countries have been 
making efforts to establish themselves against each other in the world markets in their 
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productivity. Bosworth and Collins (2007) provide some broad pointers in this regard. They 
estimate that Chinese labour productivity in each of the major three sectors was 70% that in 
India in 1978. By 2004, the level of Chinese output per worker had risen to 110% in services, 
130% in the primary sector and 220% in the secondary sector of the Indian levels of 
productivity per worker. Noticeably, more than double the level of productivity per worker in 
the secondary sector in China particularly might translate into higher real labour costs and 
erode China’s labour cost advantage in manufacturing vis-à-vis India and other developing 
countries. However, China has been much better placed than India in respect of physical 
infrastructure, labour market flexibility and political capacity to take quick decisions and 
assure effective implementation. In macroeconomic management, too, China has managed 
to successfully keep its exchange rate undervalued despite running current and capital 
account surpluses and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. In comparison, India has to 
manage the impossible trinity of interest rate, foreign exchange rate and inflation rate in the 
face of mounting foreign exchange reserves and an appreciating exchange rate. 
10. Concluding  remarks 
Finally, we briefly turn to the thematic poser suggested by the organisers of the conference in 
the title of the paper. Are labour markets in newly integrating economies different? 
Labour markets in newly integrating economies like India and China are clearly different from 
those in the advanced industrialised countries at least in two obvious respects. First, as 
noted earlier, the advanced countries have successfully completed the transition from 
agricultural to industrial workforces and, unlike India and China, they are not characterised 
by unlimited labour supplies. In the advanced countries, labour supply is the primary 
constraint on economic growth, which has to be driven by total factor productivity raising 
technological changes. With unlimited labour supplies, inter-sectoral shifts from agricultural 
to non-agricultural sectors provide an independent source of growth in addition to 
technological changes. Second, labour markets are unified in the advanced countries with 
much narrower differences in inter-sectoral marginal productivities, whereas in countries 
such as India and China, the labour markets in the modern and traditional sectors are loosely 
integrated, with the traditional sector providing the store of unlimited labour supplies (albeit 
after getting equipped with requisite human capital). 
Are the labour markets in India and China different from each other? Despite the common 
analytical feature of unlimited labour supplies, Indian and Chinese labour markets differ in at 
least two respects. First, India will but China will not be experiencing the demographic 
dividend of a rising share of working age population. The challenge facing India more than 
China is how fast society and polity can manage to upgrade the skill and education base of 
the growing working age population and raise their work participation while maintaining the 
momentum of present rapid economic growth so as to reap the benefits of the demographic 
dividend. This realisation is reflected in the more than fivefold increase in the proposed 
outlay on higher education in the government’s Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–12) from 
USD 3,278 billion in the earlier Tenth Five Year Plan to USD 18,776 billion, which means that 
3.5% of the total proposed plan outlay has been allocated to higher education alone. The 
share of total outlay on education (school education and literacy plus higher education) has 
been increased from 6.6% of total plan outlay in the Tenth Five Year Plan to 11.1% in the 
Eleventh Five Year Plan (Planning Commission (2007)). Second, the two countries also differ 
with respect to their degree of labour market flexibility. This follows from the fact that, shaped 
by socio-political constraints, the formal as well as informal rules of the game and their 
enforcement characteristics governing minimum supply price perceptions and labour market 
participation practices differ between China and India and hence, the speed of responses to 
incentives and disincentives implicit in the incentive structure embedded in the institutional 
matrices in the two countries, even though the responses of individuals would be motivated BIS Papers No 50  127
 
 
by the universal self-interest-based behaviour in both countries. These differences enable us 
to understand Robert Solow’s (1990) characterisation of the labour market as a social 
institution that evolves in a unique fashion in each country. A detailed examination of these 
differences is, however, outside the scope of the present paper.  
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